Armistead Family History #24
1862 - Armistead Family in the Civil War (part three)
Battle of Sharpsburg/Antietam
Trying to describe what happened at the Battle of Antietam/Sharpsburg, is quite difficult. I can't begin to tell about every movement and counter-movement that took place between these two armies. After all, there are complete books written about this battle. It will require your close attention to the maps that I will include along the way. Hopefully, I don't get you too confused. I'll start out here with the fact the battle has two names. The North called it the Battle of Antietam because their defenses were set up along the Antietam River and the South called it the Battle of Sharpsburg because their positions were set up in and around Sharpsburg. So we're making progress already.
This was a very important battle of the Civil War. Significant impact was felt by both North and South. The results of this battle reverberated in both armies for months after it was over. The terrible number of casualties had an effect on soldier availability, army morale, and probably the biggest effect was on slavery. High casualties amongst the officers brought on a number of young and inexperienced officers as replacements to lead each side in future battles. The battle had a great impact on the Armistead family as well.
That map above of the Maryland Campaign gives you a good look at how we got here. Here being Sharpsburg on the Antietam River. The next map, the map of the Battlefield of Antietam, is a nice overview of the battle lines set up by the two sides. This map has the Confederate forces indicated by blue lines and the Union by red. In the first map and the others below the colors will be reversed with the Union represented by blue. The third map above shows the Confederate defensive positions on the afternoon of the 15th (map on the left). You can see from the dark lines they only had four divisions in place on the east of Sharpsburg, and along the Hagerstown Pike. By the afternoon of the 16th (map on the right) Jackson's and Walker's divisions had filled in and McClelland had his forces in place as well. But, McClelland decided he was not ready to strike just yet and so he waited to implement his plan on the 17th. More about that is below.
To help with understanding the battle, study this overview map of the area with place names. It is a little hard to read but, starting from the top you can see Hooker's location along the Hagerstown Pike. Move south down the Hagerstown Pike and note the names, such as North Woods, the Cornfield, East Woods, Dunker Church, Mumma & Roulette Farms. The road just south of Dunker Church that intersects on the east side is where D.H. Hill is entrenched. It is called the Sunken Road, but would later be known as the Bloody Lane. Continuing south you can see the town of Sharpsburg, the Boonsboro Pike, the Lower Bridge, later known as Burnside Bridge, Antietam Creek, and the road to Harpers Ferry heading south out of Sharpsburg. These are landmarks and features that will be prominent in the battle to come.
General McClelland arrived with his troops on September 15th. At that time he decided that the troops had pushed hard on their march that day so he gave them time to fix a hot meal and rest and he needed time to inspect the Confederate defenses. The next day, the 16th, arrived along with heavy fog that did not burn off until later in the day. This delayed McClelland's inspection of the area to determine if any changes had been made by the enemy. Once this was accomplished, he was able to determine the best plan for attacking the South's lines. However, by this time the day was too far advanced to make an attack. He would now have to wait until the 17th. McClellan was criticized by some for not attacking Lee's defenses sooner. Indeed he most likely would have routed Lee's army because of the small number of troops they had on hand those first two days. (1)
McClellan's plan was based around three bridges crossing the Antietam, the Upper, Middle, and Lower Bridges. He would attack along these three fronts. First, Fighting Joe Hooker would take the right flank, cross the Upper Bridge, and then hit the Hagerstown Pike and head south to attack Lee's left flank. He would be supported by Brigadier-General Mansfield and General Sumner. On his left, McClelland placed Ambrose Burnside in charge to attack across the Lower Bridge, which quickly became known as Burnside's Bridge, and to then hit Lee's right flank. His goal was to turn Lee's right flank and then push it back toward Sharpsburg. Fitz-John Porter was placed in the Middle along the Boonsboro Pike and would be in reserve and used to repulse any counterattack by Lee or he could have him attack straight into Lee's middle and then wheel right or left to help Burnside or Hooker destroy half of Lee's army. On the evening of the 16th, Hooker crossed the Upper Bridge, moved into place astride the Hagerstown Pike, and camped in line of battle to be ready for first light. (2)
The attack began at first light, 6:00 am. Shelby Foote, in his book, The Civil War, A Narrative, described the start of the battle like this.
"It came in gray, with a pearly mist that shrouded the fields and woodland, and it came with a crash of musketry, backed by the deeper roar of cannon fire that mounted in volume and intensity until it was continuous, jarring the earth beneath the feet of the attackers and defenders. Hooker bore down, his three divisions in line abreast, driving the rebel pickets southward onto the high ground where the road flanked by what now was called the East wood and the West Wood, ran past the squat white block of the Dunker Church. That was his immediate objective, barely a thousand yards away though he was already taking heavy losses. Noting the glint of bayonets and the boil of smoke from the forty-acre cornfield, he called a halt while six of his batteries came up and began to flail the standing grain with shell and canister, their three dozen fieldpieces joined presently by heavier long-range guns pouring in a crossfire from the ridge beyond the creek. Haversacks and splintered muskets began to leap up through the dust and smoke, along with the broad-leafed stalks of corn and the dismembered heads and limbs of men. Hooker said later that every stalk in the northern and greater part of the field was cut as closely as would have been done with a knife.' " (3)
When Hooker's men resumed the attack through the West and East Woods and into the cornfield, they found the Confederate's firepower had not been reduced by the batteries' heavy bombardment of the cornfield. Eventually, Jackson's men were pushed back. However, Jackson had earlier sent orders to General Hood to come up in support. He arrived in time (7:20 am) to stop the flood of Union soldiers and, after two hours of fighting, his men pushed them back across the cornfield. To blunt Hood's counterattack, General Mansfield came down the Pike (8:40 am) in support and started his own counterattack. Seeing the heavy fighting that was happening on his left, Lee pulled General Walker from his right flank and sent him into the battle on the left to support Hood. With this help and the fact General Mansfield was killed during the North's counterattack, Lee's men were able to stop the northern troops just short of Dunker Church. (4)
But once again, the North had reserves ready to jump into the fray. This time it was Union General Edward Vose Sumner. He did not fare any better. Sumner's order to quick time the march forward went like this, "moving southwest across the open stretch of ground between the East Wood and Dunkard Church. It was then that he was struck, two-thirds of the way back down the column and squarely on the flank, with results that were sudden and altogether murderous. Too tightly wedged to maneuver as a unit, or even dodge as individuals, men fell in windrows, the long files writhing like wounded snakes. More than two thousand of them were shot down within a quarter of an hour. 'My God, we must get out of this!' Sumner cried. His soldiers thought so, too, scrambling frantically for the rear as the graybacks charged." (5)
The force that stopped Sumner's counterattack was General McLaws' Division. He and Anderson had only arrived from Harpers Ferry, with their two divisions, earlier that morning. By the time McLaws found General Lee and received his instructions, got the orders to his troops and they maneuvered into place, they were immediately needed on the attack. Turns out it was just at the right time to stop Sumner. McLaws arrival on the left would be the first of two fortuitous arrivals this day for General Lee. At the same time Lee ordered McLaws to the left, he ordered Anderson's division to reinforce D.H. Hill in the center at the Sunken Road.
Sumner had come up to help in a hurry with his 2nd Division, Sedgewick's Division, but it turned out, his quick march had caused a separation between Sedgewick and French's Division, the 3rd Division. With some confusing or misunderstood orders, French ended up moving his division in a more southerly direction. Sumner's 1st Division, Richardson's Division, was further behind and was held in reserve. So as Sedgewick's column was being attacked by McLaws, French's Division was approaching an eroded country lane, known as the Sunken Road (9:00 am). This sunken road provided significant natural protection. Wooden rail fences running along each side of the lane afforded excellent material for extra fortification. Unfortunately for the Union force, the confederates of D.H. Hill's division already occupied that excellent defensive position.
But first, before they actually approached the lane, French's men encountered sniper fire, so he sent his leading brigade under Brigadier General Weber to clean out the Confederates in the direction of the sniper fire. This they did and then proceeded to march up and over a ridge. Weber's Brigade passed over the crest of the ridge and down the other side right into the sights of 2600 Confederate soldiers who were able to lay down deadly fire against the unsuspecting Union forces. They unloaded a closeup and deadly volley directly into the brigade, instantly erasing the first rank of three regiments. Weber's Brigade suffered heavy casualties with practically none for the Confederates.
For some reason, French decided to try the exact same approach with Col. Dwight Morris' brigade. It too was hit with devastating results and high casualties. Now to make matters worse, French received orders from Sumner to press the attack. This he did, with his last brigade, Brigadier General Nathan Kimball's. (10:00 am) And with the same result, heavy casualties and Kimball's Brigade retreating to the crest of the hill and hitting the ground on the other side. (6)
As mentioned, R.H. Anderson had arrived with McLaws from Harpers Ferry. He was directed to reinforce D.H. Hill along Sunken Road. At 10:15 am Anderson and his men rushed to reinforce D.H. Hill's men in the Sunken Road. You can see from the map below that when Anderson's Division came up, they had to cross open fields at Piper's Farm to get to Hill's location. Pryor's Brigade is represented by the red arrow on the left pointing toward the red angled line along the Sunken Road. That is where the Armistead brothers were leading the charge. Union artillery laid down a deadly firestorm of shells on the men as they raced across the open field, inflicting heavy losses. Anderson was wounded shortly after arriving at Piper farm and was removed from the field. Succeeding him was Brigadier General Roger A Pryor, who had no experience leading a division under fire. Pryor had been the brigade commander over Anthony and Thomas Stewart Armistead's 8th FL brigade and now, after assuming command of the division, he sent his old brigade into the left of the Sunken Road and Wright's brigade into the right. Anthony and Thomas were both officers in Company E so they were most likely out in front of their men. The immediate loss of their commander and then the devastating loss of life, including many officers, as they crossed the field created great confusion for those men who made it to the Sunken Road. These reinforcements had taken heavy casualties by the time they arrived at the lane where conditions were dire. Brigadier General Ambrose Wright's brigade, which had been defending the lane from the beginning had been whittled down to only 250 men.
Now Union General Richardson was ordered to attack with his division against the Sunken Road. The Union forces had 12,000 men to throw at the confederates in the lane. The defenders had considerably less at only 7,000 even after Anderson's men came up. (11:00 am) (7)
Heavy fighting in and around the lane must have been horrible. Imagine the noise of artillery shells exploding, rifle fire in close quarters, men packed together, the yelling, screaming, thick smoke, men falling everywhere, and major confusion all around. What a nightmare situation!
By 11:45 am, the impenetrable defensive position of the Confederates was becoming untenable. In an attempt to get his men organized Colonel Carnot Posey, temporarily pulled his men out of the lane to try to get them re-formed. But seeing these men pulling out of the Sunken Road, Anderson's two brigades thought they were retreating and began to flee the bloody environs of the lane. Two of Hill's original brigades defending the lane pulled out as well. At this point, the Union forces were in a full-on attack and flanked each end of the Sunken Road. Now they were able to fire down the length of the lane. Eventually the Confederate line crumbled completely and the lane, now known as the Bloody Lane, was in Union hands. (9)
It was only about 1pm.
The battle for the cornfield and the East Woods, and the battle for the Bloody Lane were now mostly at a standstill.
While these two battles had been going on, things were happening at the third prong of McClellan's three-pronged attack as well. At the beginning of the day, Confederate commander Brigadier General Robert Toombs was defending the Lower bridge. He mostly left command up to Colonel Henry L. Benning. Out of the adequate number of units that started the morning defending the bridge, two divisions had been pulled out by Lee and sent to reinforce other positions on his line that needed immediate help. This left only 500 men to defend the crossing of the Lower Bridge. On the Union side, McClellan assigned Major General Ambrose E. Burnside to attack across the lower bridge. He was in command of 13,800 Union soldiers. (10)
This encounter should have been over in short order, right? Superior numbers, even from the beginning, let alone after the two divisions were pulled out, should have allowed the Northern forces to overwhelm the confederates. This was McClellan's plan. He thought Burnside would fold up Lee's right flank and push it back toward the middle. Fortunately for the confederates, two things worked in their favor. First, the bridge was only a ten-foot-wide bridge. This caused a funneling of Burnsides men together as they advanced across the bridge, allowing the confederates to fire into their numbers with great effect. And, as you saw in the photo above, the confederate side of the river was marked by a 40 to 80-foot bluff that was a perfect position for the confederates to fire down on the Union soldiers as they approached and as they crossed the bridge. (11)
At 10:00 am the first attack was made on the bridge. The Union soldiers came under withering fire from the confederates and were quickly repulsed. A second assault at 10:45 am, ended with the same result. By the time the third attack was planned, after two failures of straight-on assault, more planning and more men were put into the next attack, and it proved to be successful. Besides the planning and more men, however, the biggest single factor for success was the fact the 500 confederate troops were exhausted and they were almost out of ammunition. As the Union forces began their last assault on the bridge at 12:00 noon, the Confederates started pulling out. With 500 men, the Confederates had held off 14,000 union troops for three hours and had saved Lee's army by preventing those forces from hitting Lee from the South and possibly crushing his army.
Upon finally making his way across the bridge, Burnside ordered his men to hold their advance until all the men were across. Then he reformed his divisions before he was ready to advance. Not until 3:00 pm did Burnside order his men forward and they started their march in a northwesterly direction toward Sharpsburg. With this many men, it still looked promising for Burnside, even after the long delay. By this time, Lee's forces had fallen back and formed on a line east of Sharpsburg. At about 3:15 pm Burnside's four divisions, collided with D.R. Jones' division and Walker's division. Fierce fighting ensued. Union forces were on the verge of rolling up Lee's right flank and crushing Lee's army. If this had happened the South would have been effectively defeated. But it didn't happen, because right then the second of those two fortunate and timely arrivals I mentioned before took place.
You'll recall that Jackson had left A.P. Hill at Harpers Ferry to collect everything usable that he could and that Lee had sent a courier to tell Hill to come up with all haste. Early on the 17th, about 6:30 am, Hill had received Lee's orders. Making a hard 6-hour march to Sharpsburg, Hill arrived ahead of his men and found Lee to receive his orders. At 4:20 pm, Hill's lead brigade, under Brigadier General Maxey Gregg, arrived on the field just at the right time and was thrown into the battle on Burnside's left flank. You can see from the map, that coming up from Harpers Ferry put Hill's troops in the right place at the right time. Gregg's brigade immediately advanced across Otto's cornfield. (12)
Atlas of the battlefield of Antietam, prepared under the direction of the Antietam Battlefield Board, Lieut. Col. Geo. W. Davis, U.S.A., president, gen. E.A. Carman, U.S.V., gen. H Heth, C.S.A. Surveyed by Lieut. Col. E.B. Cope, engineer, H.W. Mattern, assistant engineer, of the Gettysburg National Park. Drawn by Charles H. Ourand, 1899. Position of troops by gen. E. A. Carman. Published by authority of the Secretary of War, under the direction of the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, 1908. | Library of Congress (loc.gov)
Intense fighting ensued, but then, at 4:30 pm, more of Hill's troops arrived (Branch's Brigade) on the field from Harpers Ferry and joined Gregg's forces. Among these troops were the 33rd North Carolina Infantry, and Lieutenant Henry Hyer Baker. After heavy fighting, the left flank of McClellan's army collapsed. Burnside eventually ordered his troops to pull back. "By day's end, Burnside's Corps had gone from nearly destroying Lee's army to now just counting itself lucky to cling to the West side of the Antietam." (13)
The Battle of Sharpsburg/Antietam was over.
On the 18th General Lee "offered battle", but McClellan, after confirming with his generals, and still under the illusion that Lee's army was much larger than it actually was, declined to engage.
That night Lee withdrew across the Potomac and slipped away. His army, though it had looked at times like it would be crushed, lived to fight another day, but Lee had paid a heavy price. Thomas Stewart Armistead and Henry Hyer Baker moved out with Lee, but my great-granduncle, Anthony Armistead lay dead on the field of battle.
Next, is the aftermath. What were the repercussions?
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